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Abstract
This paper is devoted to the Polish leniency programme, including the conditions 
of obtaining lenient treatment and the applicable procedure. The type, scope 
and form of information that must be submitted are commented on as well as 
the marker system and summary applications. The intersection of the leniency 
scheme with private enforcement of antitrust rules is discussed in detail. Special 
attention is devoted to the possible ways in which private antitrust plaintiffs might 
access information submitted to the UOKiK by leniency applicants. Thoroughly 
analysed are the rules regulating the possibility of obtaining relevant documents 
from the UOKiK and from the defendant in the course of civil proceedings as well 
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as the status of the administrative decision in subsequent civil litigation. The paper 
covers also the scope of the leniency recipient’s civil liability and touches upon 
the possible ways in which it could be limited to enhance the effectiveness of the 
leniency scheme. Some suggestions de lege ferenda are also provided concerning 
the means of increasing this effectiveness without prejudice to the private parties’ 
right to compensation. 
Classifications and key words: competition law, leniency, whistle-blowing, cartels, 
private enforcement, discovery, protection of applications, follow-on actions, scope 
of damages
I. Introduction
Polish competition law has evolved fully in line with European trends, at least 
since Poland’s accession to the EU. In particular the modernisation process 
of EC antitrust rules, started by the 2004 legislation package, made a large 
impact on Poland. Its main features included: a decentralized application 
of EU competition law by National Competition Authorities (NCAs) and 
national courts as well as the strengthening of the fight against the gravest 
forms of antitrust infringements – cartels, in particular. One of the crucial 
elements of the enforcement reform has been the Commission’s initiative to 
strengthen private enforcement of antitrust law, so that all parties injured by 
anti-competitive practices could seek redress of their grievances in national 
courts. The increased importance of private enforcement is supposed to enable 
the Commission and the NCAs to concentrate their resources on the fight 
against cartels. Since US and EU experiences clearly demonstrate that the most 
effective tool for cartel detection is a leniency scheme (“corporate amnesty”), 
a successful modernisation of competition law needs both: a successful leniency 
policy and effective private enforcement. It is thus important to examine their 
relationship determining, in particular, whether the key features of the reform 
will complement each other or whether they might clash. 
The paper will commence with a short overview of the Polish leniency 
programme (the current state of private enforcement of Polish competition 
law has been described in detail elsewhere1). The following analysis will focus 
on three crucial problems in this field: the use of corporate leniency statements 
as evidence in civil proceedings, the effect of decisions taken by the President 
of the Polish Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (hereinafter, 
1 A. Jurkowska, “Antitrust Private Enforcement – Case of Poland” (2008) 1(1) YARS 
59–80.
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UOKiK) on subsequent private lawsuits and, the scope of civil liability of a 
successful leniency applicant. However, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, 
there have been no judgments of Polish courts in cases related to the leniency 
programme yet. As a result, the assessment presented in this paper is based on 
the interpretation of relevant provisions of Polish law, on literature, on case 
law indirectly related to this issue and on a comparative analysis of US and 
EU experiences. When no satisfying answers de lege lata seem possible, some 
suggestions de lege ferenda shall be made.
II. Polish leniency programme
1. General information
Literature defines leniency as “the granting of immunity from penalties or 
the reduction of penalties for antitrust violations in exchange for cooperation 
with the antitrust enforcement authorities”2. In Poland, these penalties may 
take the form of administrative fines only3, since no criminal liability for 
antitrust violations exists in the Polish legal system4. The UOKiK President 
may impose pecuniary sanctions of up to 10% of the undertaking’s revenue 
obtained in the year prior to the year in which the decision is issued5. 
 The Polish leniency programme was introduced in 2004 by an amendment 
to the Act of 15 December 2000 on Competition and Consumer Protection6. 
It is currently regulated by Article 109 of the Act of 16 February 2007 on 
2 W. Wils, Efficiency and Justice in European Antitrust Enforcement, Oxford and Portland, 
Oregon 2008, p. 113.
3 See S. Dudzik, P. K. Rosiak, “Poland” [in:] D. Cahill (ed.), The Modernisation of EU 
Competition Law Enforcement in the EU. FIDE 2004 National Reports, Cambridge 2004, 
p. 477.
4 A minor exception is the criminal liability for bid-rigging on the basis of Articles 286 and 
305 of the Penal Code (Journal of Laws 1997 No. 88, item 553 with amendments); R. Molski 
[in:] T. Skoczny, A. Jurkowska, D. Miąsik (eds.), Ustawa o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów. 
Komentarz, Warszawa 2009, p. 1668. Polish leniency programme does not provide for immunity 
from criminal prosecution, therefore it is to be expected that it will not become effective in 
detecting bid-rigging agreements.
5 Office of Competition and Consumer Protection, Guidelines on Setting Fines for 
Competition-Restricting Practices (hereinafter referred to as: Fining Guidelines), UOKiK 
Official Journal 2008 No. 4, item 33. 
6 Journal of Laws 2004 No. 93, item 891.
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Competition and Consumer Protection7 (hereinafter, Competition Act). 
Although the new provision is an exact copy of Article 103a of the former Act 
of 2004, the shape of Polish corporate amnesty has in actual fact substantially 
changed since 2004. Key new procedural rules8 were recently introduced by 
the Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 26 January 2009 concerning the 
mode of proceeding in cases of enterprises’ applications to the President of 
the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection for immunity from or 
reduction of fines9 (hereinafter, the Regulation) and by the Guidelines of the 
President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection concerning 
the leniency programme10 (hereinafter, Leniency Guidelines). However, while 
the Competition Act and the Regulation are acts of universally binding law 
(see Article 87 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 199711), 
the Guidelines are an act of soft-law only which is not formally binding on the 
UOKiK President. The purpose of the Guidelines is to increase transparency 
of the provisions of the two binding acts serving as a guide for entrepreneurs 
(see point 2 of the Leniency Guidelines). Nevertheless, it is very likely that 
the authority will respect legitimate expectations of the addressees of the 
Guidelines, even if their language is not as definite as paragraph 4 of the 
Fining Guidelines, where the UOKiK President unequivocally promises to 
apply the latter act.
The Polish leniency scheme is generally in line with the Model Leniency 
Programme of the European Competition Network (hereafter, ECN)12 
although some discrepancies exist. One of the specific features of the Polish 
scheme is its scope – it is available to parties to every anti-competitive 
agreement which infringes Article 6(1) of the Competition Act or Article 
81 of EC Treaty, irrespective of whether the agreement is horizontal or 
vertical (see Article 109(1) of the Competition Act). That makes the scope 
of the Polish leniency programme wider than the Commission’s Leniency 
Notice (hereinafter, Commission Leniency Notice)13, the Model Leniency 
Programme of the ECN (point 4) or the leniency policy of the Office of 
 7 Journal of Laws 2007 No. 50, item 331, amendments: Journal of Laws 2007 No. 99, item 
99; Journal of Laws 2007 No. 171, item 1206.
 8 They include summary applications and marker system, which will be further discussed 
below.
 9 Journal of Laws 2009 No. 20, item 109.
10 They can be downloaded from UOKiK’s website: http://www.uokik.gov.pl, although 
regrettably only in Polish version.
11 Journal of Laws 1997 No. 78, item 483.
12 Available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/documents.html.
13 See Commission notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases, 
point 1, OJ [2006] C 298/17.
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Fair Trading14 and the Bundeskartellamt15, all of which concern cartels only. 
Leniency for all types of anti-competitive agreements, but not for the abuse 
of dominance, is possible also in France16. The UOKiK President may reduce 
the fines in cases falling outside the scope of the Leniency Notice, by treating 
the cooperation with the authorities as a mitigating factor as prescribed in 
point 4.1(e) of the Fining Guidelines. It can be expected however that, due 
to the special importance of the fight against cartels, possible reductions on 
that ground shall be significantly smaller than the 50% which is the maximal 
reduction available under the leniency programme.
2. Conditions and procedure for obtaining leniency
The UOKiK President shall grant total immunity from fines to the 
undertaking, which has been the first to provide the authority with information 
sufficient for instituting antitrust proceedings or with proof rendering it 
possible to issue a decision asserting the practice as anti-competitive. In both 
cases, certain additional conditions must be met (see Article 109(1) of the 
Competition Act) and the relevant information or proof cannot be in the 
possession of the UOKiK at the moment of filing the motion for immunity. The 
condition of “information being sufficient for instituting antitrust proceedings” 
should be understood here, in the context of the Commission’s Leniency 
Notice, as enabling the authority to carry out a targeted inspection17. The 
additional conditions include: full cooperation with the UOKiK and the fact 
that the applicant cannot be the initiator or a coercer of other undertakings 
to participate in the practice. A company seeking immunity must also cease its 
participation in the agreement on the day of filing the application at the very 
latest (Competition Act Article 109(1)(2-4)). Still, literature argues18 that an 
inflexible approach to latter condition of “ceasing participation” is ineffective 
14 See OFT’s Guidance as to the appropriate amount of penalty, p. l2, available at OFT’s 
website http://www.oft.gov.uk.
15 See Notice no 9/2006 of the Bundeskartellamt on the immunity from and reduction of 
fines in cartel cases- Leniency Programme of 7 March 2006, available at Bundeskartellamt’s 
website http://www.bundeskartellamt.de.
16 See art. L 464 – 2 point 4 of Code de Commerce, available at http://www.legigrance.
gouv.fr.
17 S. Sołtysiński, “Z doświadczeń programu Leniency w Brukseli i w Warszawie” [in:] 
C. Banasiński (ed.) Prawo konkurencji – stan obecny oraz przewidywane kierunki zmian, Warszawa 
2006, p. 47.
18 D. Piejko, “Leniency w polskich i europejskich przepisach prawa ochrony konkurencji” 
[in:] Amerykański i europejski system ochrony konkurencji, Warszawa 2007, s. 56–57. Similarly R. 
Molski [in:] T. Skoczny, A. Jurkowska, D. Miąsik (eds.), Ustawa…, p. 1672–1673.
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because it may alert other members of the agreement, enabling them to destroy 
or conceal relevant evidence. In the authors’ view, as a suggestion de lege 
ferenda, the precise moment of abandoning all anti-competitive activities by 
the leniency applicant should be set by the competition authority. This would 
bring the Polish scheme further in line with the Model Leniency Programme 
of the ECN 19 and the Commission’s Leniency Notice20. 
Abolishing the “ringleader exception”, which excludes instigators and 
coercers from the possibility of using the Polish leniency programme, can 
also be suggested21. While this proposal is certainly more controversial, its aim 
is to increase the deterrent effect of the scheme which, apart from being an 
investigatory tool, should stop undertakings from entering into and remaining 
in anti-competitive agreements by incentivising them to distrust each other. 
A ringleader that is unable to confess is more trustworthy for other present 
or future participants. This effect is especially striking in duopolistic markets, 
when the one approaching the only competitor with a proposal of a market-
allocating or price-fixing agreement, would be considered the instigator that is 
unable to apply for leniency. The other duopolist could then safely enter into 
the cartel and would have no incentive to confess since its partner would be 
precluded from doing so. Precluding immunity for ringleaders might therefore 
lead to perpetuating cartels in highly concentrated, especially duopolistic, 
markets22.
Additional problems could arise in situations of difficulty in identifying 
the ringleader. The possibility of fraud on the part of a ringleader, who 
could approach other undertakings with a cartel offer and then “betray” 
them to the authority, could only add to the deterrent effect of the leniency 
programme, since distrust is natural between competitors and double so 
between competitors who contemplate entering into an illegal agreement23. 
In addition, since the leniency programme itself necessitates some sacrifices on 
the part of the competition authority’s determination to punish all wrongdoers, 
argumentation based on natural justice should not lead to the creation of 
a scheme which is neither just nor effective. Seeing as it was decided that the 
interest in detecting and deterring cartels outweighs the interest in punishing 
19 Part V point 13 section 1.
20 Point 12 letter b.
21 For example, immunity for ringleaders is available in France, the Netherlands and the 
UK. Polish exclusion is compatible with EC Notice and ECN Model Programme, as well as the 
US and German models. See A. Schwab, Ch. Steinle, “Pitfalls of the European Competition 
Network – Why Better Protection of Leniency Applicants and Legal Regulation of Case 
Allocation is Needed” (2008) 29(9) European Competition Law Review 525. 
22 See Ch. R. Leslie, “Antitrust Amnesty, Game Theory and Cartel Stability” (2006) 31 
Journal of Corporation Law 478-481. 
23 Ibidem.
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every infringer of antitrust law24, a leniency programme should be as effective 
as possible in order to justify the basic departure from the rules of natural 
justice that lie at its roots25.
A reduction of fines is available for undertakings which are not eligible 
for full immunity26 but have provided the UOKiK President with evidence 
which will, to a substantial degree, contribute to issuing a decision asserting 
the practice as anti-competitive27 and which have ceased participating in the 
agreement at the aforementioned time (Competition Act Article 109(2)).The 
size of the reduction is dependent on the applicant’s place in the “queue” 
– up to 50% for the first undertaking to apply for reduction, up to 30% for 
the second and up to 20% for subsequent applicants (see Leniency Guidelines, 
point 31). 
According to paragraph 2(2) and (3) of the Regulation and point 8 of the 
Leniency Guidelines, an application for leniency can be filed either in writing 
(it may be brought directly to the UOKiK or it may be sent by post, electronic 
mail or by fax28) or orally. An oral application is submitted for the official record, 
which is prepared by a member of staff of the UOKiK who puts the date and time 
of submission onto the document29. The applicant is required to sign the record 
in accordance with Article 68(2) of the Administrative Procedure Code (KPA)30. 
When the application is submitted in writing, the UOKiK President provides the 
undertaking with the confirmation of the date and time of its receipt31. There are 
no provisions regarding the possibility of submitting applications and evidence 
24 See point 3 of Commission Leniency Notice.
25 See R. Molski [in:] T. Skoczny, A. Jurkowska, D. Miąsik (eds.), Ustawa…, p. 1669–1670, 
1674. This Author supports the exclusion of ringleaders from the benefits of leniency in light of 
arguments relating to moral reasons and the rule of retribution, stating that serious wrongdoers 
should be punished not only by a heavy fine but also by exclusion from the benefits of leniency 
programmes. It remains to be seen whether moral and retributive reasons justify making 
leniency programmes less effective than they could be and, in effect, allowing larger number 
of cartels to exist and flourish without detection and any kind of punishment. 
26 Including ringleaders.
27 For example, the statements of the company’s employees relating to the functioning of 
the cartel, were considered to constitute such evidence in the decision of the UOKiK President 
of 18 September 2006, DOK 107/06 , available at http://www.uokik.gov.pl. See C. Banasiński, 
E. Piontek (eds.), Ustawa o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów, Warszawa 2009, p. 1010.
28 When the application is sent by e-mail or by fax, it is necessary to submit the original 
or duly certified documents to the UOKiK in three days time. If the deadline is met, the 
application shall be deemed to have been submitted at the moment of sending the e-mail or 
fax. See point 9 of the Leniency Guidelines. This requirement does not concern e-mails signed 
with certified electronic signature, see Leniency Guidelines, footnote 4.
29 Paragraph 2(3) of the Regulation.
30 Journal of Laws 2000 No. 98, item 1071 with amendments.
31 Paragraph 2 section 1 of the Regulation.
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in hypothetical terms.32 According to point 7 of the Leniency Guidelines, an 
entrepreneur may however call a dedicated phone line to present the facts of the 
case to an employee of UOKiK in hypothetical terms in order to get a preliminary 
assessment as to the possibility of obtaining lenient treatment.
The application should contain a description of the agreement and, in 
particular, specify: the undertakings, products or services and the territory 
covered by the agreement, its purpose, duration and circumstances of its 
conclusion, the roles of particular participants33 as well as the names and official 
posts of individuals playing a significant role in the agreement. The applicant 
must also specify whether a similar submission was made to a NCA of another 
EU Member State or to the Commission34 (paragraph 3(2) of the Regulation). 
Finally, two additional statements are necessary: one concerning the fact that 
the applicant ceased its participation in the agreement (specifying the exact 
date of the cessation) and another, stating that it was not the instigator of the 
agreement and that it was not inducing others to join it (paragraph 3(3) of 
the Regulation). Attached should be all relevant evidence in the possession of 
the applicant such as: minutes of meetings held in relation to the agreement, 
e-mails, photographs of sms messages, relevant notes, restaurant or hotel 
bills, airplane tickets, market data from trade associations’ reports etc.35. 
The attached documents should be either originals or duly certified copies36. 
When relevant documents or their parts are drawn in foreign language, a duly 
certified translation into Polish should also be attached37. 
3. New forms of applications
Since 2009, the Polish leniency scheme contains two simplified forms of 
leniency applications. First, by submitting some basic information about the 
alleged anti-competitive agreement, companies can now obtain a marker38 – a 
32 Compare point 16 letter b and point 19 of the Commission Leniency Notice, see also 
R. Molski [in:] T. Skoczny, A. Jurkowska, D. Miąsik (eds.), Ustawa…, p. 1687.
33 Especially the identity of the instigator and undertakings coercing others, see point 13.6 
of the Leniency Guidelines.
34 If so, the name of the authority and the date of the application should also be submitted 
(point 13.8 of the Guidelines).
35 C. Banasiński, E. Piontek (eds.), Ustawa…, p. 1001.
36 Article 51(1) of Competition Act; point 15 of Leniency Guidelines.
37 Article 51(3) of Competition Act. UOKiK requires the applicant to attach an official copy 
of applicant’s data from National Court Register and, in case of submitting the application by 
the attorney, the power of attorney. See C. Banasiński, E. Piontek (eds.), Ustawa…, p. 1001.
38 On the nature of markers in leniency programmes, see e.g. R. Molski, “Programy łagodnego 
traktowania – panaceum na praktyki kartelowe?” (2004) 1 Kwartalnik Prawa Publicznego 198; 
Vol. 2009, 2(2)
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“place in the queue” – gaining additional time for gathering enough evidence 
to submit a full application. The information which has to be provided in 
order to secure a marker include: list of participants, duration and purpose of 
the agreement, products/services and territory covered by the agreement and 
information, whether a leniency application has also been submitted to another 
NCA or to the Commission. The application should include “preliminary” 
information or evidence sufficient for instituting antitrust proceedings or 
issuing a decision asserting the agreement as anti-competitive as well as the 
statements as to the cessation of participation in the agreement and the fact, 
that the applicant was not its ringleader39. The term “preliminary information 
or evidence” is unclear; its interpretation is in practice left to the discretion of 
the competition authority40. The UOKiK President confirms the date and time 
of the receipt of the application and specifies what additional information must 
be submitted to complete the process as well as the deadline for providing it. 
If the submission is completed within the specified date, it is deemed to have 
been received at the moment of filing the first “shortened” application41.
Second, after submitting a leniency application to the Commission (when 
a cartel covers the territories of more than three Member States), a company 
can secure for itself “the first place in the queue” in Poland. Filing a “summary 
application”42 is possible only for companies applying for full immunity 
(not when the applicant wishes to apply for a fine reduction)43. It allows 
the applicant to save time and effort necessary to file a full application but, 
at the same time, gives the company the certainty of being able to submit 
a full application to the UOKiK if the domestic authority chooses to takes 
up the case44. A summary application must contain the same information 
R. Molski [in:] T. Skoczny, A. Jurkowska, D. Miąsik (eds.), Ustawa…, p. 1690–1693; J. S. Sandhu, 
“The European commission’s Leniency Policy: a Success” (2007) 28(3) European Competition 
Law Review 150–152; M. J. Reynolds, “Immunity and Leniency in EU Cartel Cases: Current 
Issues” (2006) 27(2) European Competition Law Review 82–85.
39 Paragraph 5 of the Regulation.
40 R. Molski [in:] T. Skoczny, A. Jurkowska, D. Miąsik (eds.), Ustawa…, p. 1691.
41 Paragraph 5(4) of the Regulation; point 17 of the Leniency Guidelines. 
42 See paragraph 11 of the Regulation and point 32 of Leniency Guidelines. 
43 Paragraph 11(1) of the Regulation. This solution is consistent with point 46 of ECN 
Model Leniency Programme.
44 The possibility of filing summary applications brings the Polish leniency programme in line 
with the ECN Model Leniency Programme, see point 22. The question of case allocation in the 
ECN is dealt with in the Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition 
Authorities, Official Journal C 101, 27.04.2007, p. 43–53. On problems related to this issue and 
leniency, see e.g. A. Schab, Ch. Steinle, “Pitfalls…”, p. 523-531. On the cooperation within the 
ECN, see also S. Dudzik, “Wpływ członkowstwa Polski w Unii Europejskiej na administrację 
rządową na przykładzie kooperacyjnego modelu stosowania wspólnotowego prawa konkurencji” 
[in:] S. Biernat, S. Dudzik, M. Niedźwiedź (eds.), Przystąpienie Polski do Unii Europejskiej. 
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as an application for a marker as well as, additionally, a list of the Member 
States where evidence of the cartel exists45. Summary applications must be 
complemented by statements relating to the cessation of the participation 
in the agreement, to the fact that the applicant was not its ringleader and 
information about submissions to the Commission or other NCAs46. Unlike 
other submissions, the summary application does not have to be accompanied 
by information or evidence necessary to institute antitrust proceedings or to 
issue a decision asserting the practice as anti-competitive. A deadline for 
the completion of the application is specified only if the UOKiK President 
actually decides to institute proceeding concerning the agreement covered by 
the summary application. When the deadline is met, the application is deemed 
to have been received at the moment of the submission of the summary 
application.47 The summary application may be submitted either in writing or 
orally for the record48.
4. Decision by the President
Having analysed a leniency application, the UOKiK President notifies 
the submitting party in writing whether the conditions for obtaining 
immunity or a fine reduction are met. However, this notification has only 
a preliminary nature – its permanence dependents on the applicant’s further 
cooperation with the authority. At this point, the applicant is also informed 
of the order in which its submission was received49 (the order is established 
without consideration of these applications which were dismissed50). An 
application can be withdrawn at any moment before the President issues 
his/her decision ending the proceedings. The withdrawal does not affect the 
already assigned place in the queue of the remaining applications51. The final 
determination as to the granting of immunity or fine reduction is made by 
the UOKiK President in a decision concerning the agreement referred to in 
the application52. 
Traktat akcesyjny i jego skutki, Kraków 2003, p. 231–259; J. Bazylińska, “Współpraca w ramach 
Europejskiej Sieci Konkurencji” (2007) 11 Przegląd Ustawodawstwa Gospodarczego 2–12.
45 Paragraph 11(2) of the Regulation.
46 Paragraph 11(3) and (4) of the Regulation.
47 Paragraph 11(5) and (6) of the Regulation.
48 Point 35 of the Leniency Guidelines
49 Paragraph 8 of the Regulation.
50 Paragraph 9 of the Regulation.
51 Paragraph 10 of the Regulation.
52 R. Molski [in:] T. Skoczny, A. Jurkowska, D. Miąsik (eds.), Ustawa…, p. 1695.
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According to Article 107(1) and (3) of KPA, administrative decisions must 
be reasoned concerning the facts and the law of the case. Public authorities 
must specify the facts which were considered proven in the course of the 
proceedings, the evidence considered persuasive and the reasons for denying 
credibility to other pieces of evidence. Thus the leniency application and any 
other evidence submitted by the applicant must be mentioned in the decision of 
the UOKiK President. They are usually used to justify the authority’s findings 
as to the existence and functioning of the agreement and the level of fines 
imposed (in particular, when the applicant is granted immunity or receives 
a major reduction). The fact of the applicant’s participation in the agreement 
and its subsequent cooperation with the authority is explicitly mentioned53. 
Decisions of the UOKiK President are published on the authority’s official 
website54. Some of them are also published in its Official Journal55. The 
decisions of the UOKiK President can be appealed to the Court of Competition 
and Consumer Protection in Warsaw56. Its judgments are subject to appeal to 
the Court of Appeals57 whose judgments are, in turn, subject to cassation by 
the Supreme Court58. The decisions of the UOKiK President become final if 
no appeal is lodged within two weeks from the moment of their delivery or if 
a decision was sustained by the court. 
16 leniency applications were submitted to the UOKiK President between 
2004 and the end of 2008. The number of applications per year seems to 
have started raising in 2007 (2 received in 2006, 6 in 2007, 5 in 2008)59 but 
the scheme can still not be said to be working in a fully satisfactory manner. 
It remains to be seen whether the procedural changes of 2009 will improve 
the situation. 
53 A good example can be found in the decision mentioned in footnote 15 (DOK 107/06) 
declaring as anti-competitive an agreement on minimal prices between a producer of paints 
and lacquers and several large construction supermarkets. The cooperation of Castorama sp. z 
o.o., the first to benefit from the Polish leniency scheme, is often mentioned in the text of the 
decision, the letters and documents it submitted are referred to as evidence and the dates on 
which those documents were sent are given. While some data was removed from the decision 
(business secrets), the content of the submitted documents can easily be inferred from the 
argumentation of the decision.
54 Available at http://www.uokik.gov.pl.
55 Article 32 of Competition Act. Published version of a decision does not contain 
information qualified as business secrets.
56 Article 81 of Competition Act.
57 Article 367 § 1 of Civil Procedure Code (KPC), Journal of Laws 1964 No. 43, item 296 
with amendments.
58 Article 47935 § 2 of KPC. See K. Weitz, “Postępowanie w sprawach z zakresu ochrony 
konkurencji i konsumentów”, [in:] T. Wisniewski (ed.), Postępowanie sądowe w sprawach 
gospodarczych, Warszawa 2007, p. 156–160.
59 See UOKiK Report on Activities 2008, p. 19, available at http://www.uokik.gov.pl.
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III. Access to leniency statements
1. General rules on documentary evidence
One of the most important points on intersection between private antitrust 
enforcement and leniency schemes is the possibility of using an application for 
immunity or fine reduction (and potentially also other documents submitted 
by the applicants) as evidence in civil litigations. On the one hand, such 
a possibility would certainly strengthen the position of those seeking remedies 
for antitrust violations, since evidentiary difficulties are often listed amongst 
the gravest obstacles of private antitrust enforcement60. On the other hand, it 
might significantly reduce the attractiveness of leniency programmes, adopted 
at both domestic and EU level, resulting in fewer and/or less comprehensive 
submissions61. For the sake of preserving the effectiveness of leniency schemes, 
considered to be an important public enforcement tool, the Commission 
suggests that all leniency applications should receive special protection 
against disclosure62. For the same reason, it has intervened, as amicus curiae, 
in American civil proceedings, arguing that European leniency statements 
should not be subject to discovery in the US63.
The Polish legal system does not contain an equivalent of “pre-trial 
discovery”, a procedure typical for common law countries64. As a result, 
parties are not obliged to exchange documents or other types of evidence 
at the pre-trial stage. A litigant may induce its adversary to submit a certain 
document only by obtaining a court order to that effect65. Motions of that 
kind can be included in the statement of claims or filed at a later stage. They 
are generally admissible until the closure of the hearing66, with one important 
exception applicable to proceedings in commercial matters, conducted 
60 See, e.g., Green Paper – Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM(2005) 
672 final (hereinafter: Green Paper), point 2.1; White Paper on Damages actions for breach of 
the EC antitrust rules, COM(2008) 165 final (hereinafter: White Paper), point 2.2.
61 See Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper on Damages actions 
for breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM(2008) 165 final, point 272.
62 See White Paper, point 2.9.
63 See, e.g., K. Nordlander, “Discovering Discovery – US Discovery of EC Leniency 
Statements” (2004) 25(10) European Competition Law Review, p. 646.
64 A. Sánchez Graells, “Discovery, Confidentiality and Disclosure of Evidence Under 
the Private Enforcement of EU Antitrust Laws” (September 8, 2006), Instituto de Empresa 
Business School Working Paper No. WPED06-05, p. 7, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/
abstract=952504
65 There are no rules in the Polish civil procedure that would specify how detailed the 
description of the requested document must be.
66 Article 224 § 1 KPC.
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pursuant to Article 4791–47922 of the KPC. In private antitrust cases the 
abovementioned provisions apply when both plaintiff and defendant are 
entrepreneurs, whereas if the claim is filed by a consumer, the proceedings 
are conducted under general rules. In the former case, a rule of preclusion 
provided for in Article 47912 KPC requires the plaintiff to specify all its 
assertions, as well as the evidence supporting them, already in its statement 
of claims. A similar time limitation binds the defendant who is obliged to 
include its assertions, as well as indicate all relevant evidence, in the reply 
to the statement of claims, which is mandatory (Article 47914 § 2  KPC)67. 
Evidentiary motion submitted at a later stage will be dismissed unless the 
moving party shows that it was impossible to file the motion earlier or, that 
the need to file it did not occur before. The preclusion rule has been criticized 
by some authors as a serious burden for plaintiffs in antitrust suits68.
The court may (acting upon a motion or suo motu) oblige anyone to submit 
a document (which is in that entity’s possession) that constitutes proof of a 
material fact relevant to the case. This applies to the litigants as well as third 
parties, including public authorities69. An addressee can decline to produce 
the requested document only in specified instances: when it contains state 
secrets or when the person has the right to refuse to testify as a witness on 
circumstances referred to in that document (alternately – if he/she possesses 
the document on behalf of a third party whose refusal to submit it would be 
justified for the same reason)70.
Finally, it should be mentioned that the Polish Civil Procedure Code 
provides for a possibility of securing evidence, including documents which can 
be easily destroyed. Such a possibility exists also before the commencement 
of the court proceedings (before the statement of claims is filed). In order to 
have a certain piece of evidence secured, it must be shown that its presentation 
might be impossible/excessively difficult in the future or, due to other reasons, 
the actual state of affairs needs to be verified71. 
67 For further details see T. Szanciło, “Prekluzja w postępowaniu gospodarczym” (2007) 6 
Przegląd Prawa Handlowego 14.
68 See M. Bernatt, “Prywatny model ochrony konkurencji oraz jego realizacja w postępowaniu 
przed sądem krajowym” [in:] E. Piontek (ed.), Nowe tendencje w prawie konkurencji UE, 
Warszawa 2008, p. 340; A. Jurkowska, “Antitrust Private Enforcement…”, p. 77.
69 See T. Ereciński [in:] T. Ereciński (ed.), Kodeks postępowania cywilnego. Komentarz, vol. 1, 
Warszawa 2006, p. 573.
70 Article 248 KPC.
71 Article 310 KPC.
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2. Obtaining documents from the UOKiK President
The wording of general procedural rules might suggest that civil courts 
can oblige the UOKiK President to submit almost any document for the 
purpose of evidentiary proceedings. The Competition Act provides, however, 
for special protection of documents collected by the authority. Pursuant to 
its Article 73(1): “Information received in the course of the proceedings 
[carried out by the UOKiK President – authors’ note] may not be used in 
any other proceedings based on separate provisions” but for the exceptions 
exhaustively listed in subsequent paragraphs. The list contains two types of 
proceedings conducted, in part, before the courts, both of which are penal 
in nature72. It follows from the above that the legislator did not provide any 
explicit exceptions applying to civil lawsuits. In this respect, some authors have 
considered a possibility of relying on Article 73(2)(5) of the Competition Act 
but rightly rejected the idea. 
The aforementioned provision authorizes the UOKiK President to 
“provide competent authorities with information which may indicate that 
any separate regulations have been infringed”. It should be assumed that the 
term “competent authorities” should be understood as referring to public 
bodies which may institute proceedings ex officio – civil courts do not have 
such power73. Therefore, in civil lawsuits, courts cannot oblige the UOKiK 
President to submit a leniency application or any other documents collected 
during antitrust proceedings – if a party moves for such an order, the motion 
should be dismissed. This solution has been criticized by advocates of private 
antitrust enforcement74 as incoherent with the legislator’s intention to increase 
the number of civil lawsuits brought against antitrust law infringers75. It was 
72 I.e. penal proceedings exercised by a public-complaint procedure and fiscal penal 
proceedings.
73 C. Banasiński, E. Piontek (eds.), Ustawa…, p. 689.
74 See M. Bernatt [in:] T. Skoczny, A. Jurkowska, D. Miąsik (eds.), Ustawa o ochronie 
konkurencji i konsumentów. Komentarz, Warszawa 2009, p. 1298.
75 This intent was manifested by the elimination of public (administrative) antitrust 
proceedings initiated upon a motion. Under the previous Act of 15 December 2000 on 
Competition and Consumer Protection (Journal of Laws 2005 No. 244, item 2080, with 
amendments) private parties could formally request the UOKiK President to take actions; 
such a possibility no longer exists – proceedings are currently commenced only ex officio, except 
for merger cases. See A. Jurkowska, D. Miąsik, T. Skoczny, M. Szydło, “Nowa uokik z 2007 r. 
– kolejny krok w kierunku doskonalenia podstaw publicznoprawnej ochrony konkurencji w 
Polsce”, (2007) 4 Przegląd Ustawodawstwa Gospodarczego 4; A. Jurkowska, “Perspektywy 
prywatnego wdrażania prawa ochrony konkurencji w Polsce na tle doświadczeń Wspólnoty 
Europejskiej” (2008) 1 Przegląd Ustawodawstwa Gospodarczego 25.
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pointed out in comparison76 that the Commission assists national courts in 
their application of EC competition law by passing on information that it 
holds77. However, while the transmission of information is generally permitted 
in the EU, certain kinds of data enjoy special protection78. In contrast, Article 
73 of the Polish Competition Act applies to all information obtained by the 
UOKiK President79.
Additional protection is given to leniency statements. Article 70 par. 1 of 
the Competition Act states that: “Any information and evidence received by 
the President of the Office under the procedure of Article 109 [i.e. leniency 
procedure – authors’ note], including information on the undertaking’s 
request for renouncement of imposing a financial penalty or reducing thereof 
(leniency), shall not be rendered accessible, subject to Paragraphs 2 and 3.” This 
provision substantially limits procedural rights of those subject to proceedings 
before the UOKiK President80 in comparison to general procedural rules of 
the Administrative Procedure Code (KPA) which state that every party has 
a right to inspect files, receive information from public authorities and actively 
participate in the proceedings81. As a result of the abovementioned limitation, 
parties to antitrust proceedings will not have access to any information or 
evidence submitted by a leniency applicant until prior to passing a decision by 
the President of UOKiK (Article 70(2) of the Competition Act). However, no 
provision of Polish law specifies the exact moment when the UOKiK President 
should make the said information and evidence accessible82, although it is 
generally agreed, that parties must be given enough time (and a real possibility) 
to inspect and comment on all the evidence before the decision is issued83. 
The scope of protection against disclosure, set out in Article 70, is very broad 
76 M. Bernatt [in:] T. Skoczny, A. Jurkowska, D. Miąsik (eds.), Ustawa..., p. 1299.
77 See Article 15 para. 1 of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 
on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty 
(OJ [2003] L 1/1) and paras 21-26 of the Commission Notice on the cooperation between the 
Commission and the courts of the EU Member States in the application of Articles 81 and 82 
EC (OJ [2004] C 101).
78 These include information voluntarily submitted by a leniency applicant – see para. 26 
of the Commission Notice referred to above.
79 See M. Bernatt [in:] T. Skoczny, A. Jurkowska, T. Skoczny (eds.), Ustawa..., p. 1299.
80 Ibidem, p. 1279. Pursuant to Article 88(1) of the Competition Act: “The party to 
the proceedings shall be every person against whom the proceedings on the application of 
competition restricting practices are instituted.”
81 See Article 73, 9 and 10 of KPA.
82 According to the Leniency Guidelines, it should take place not later than when the 
UOKiK President calls upon the parties to finally inspect all evidence gathered in a given case 
(point 29).
83 C. Banasiński, E. Piontek (eds.), Ustawa..., p. 677; M. Bernatt [in:] T. Skoczny, 
A. Jurkowska, D. Miąsik (eds.), Ustawa..., p. 1282.
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covering accepted as well as rejected leniency applications84. Information 
obtained in the course of leniency proceedings can be revealed neither to the 
parties (subject to Article 70(2)) nor to third persons85 including victims of 
antitrust violations who could file a lawsuit against the infringers. Nevertheless, 
if an undertaking applying for leniency gives its written consent, the UOKiK 
President may (but is not obliged to86) grant access to the submissions of that 
particular applicant.
3. Obtaining documents from the defendant
Theoretically, an antitrust victim who sues a leniency applicant could try 
to obtain a copy of a leniency application directly from its adversary and not 
from the authority. Under general rules of civil procedure87, a motion to the 
court for ordering the submission of a document by the defendant may be 
included in the statement of claims (Article 187 § 2(3) of KPC) or filed later 
(unless the rule of preclusion applies). Nevertheless, in the authors’ opinion, 
that possibility does not seriously threaten the attractiveness of the Polish 
leniency programme. 
First, leniency applications can be made orally88 in which case the applicant 
is left with no official document describing its statement. Second, the court 
is not bound by evidentiary motions so it lies within its discretion to decide 
whether a certain document should be submitted. While making such a decision 
in relation to leniency statements, civil courts ought to consider a number 
of factors – including public interest in maintaining the effectiveness of the 
leniency scheme. Unfortunately, to the authors’ best knowledge, there are no 
Polish judgements concerning this issue. It seems highly unlikely, however, 
that Polish courts would generously grant a motion for the submission of 
a leniency application. Finally, even if such a motion was granted, the 
disobedient defendant would not be subject to any major sanctions since the 
Polish Code of Civil Procedure (KPC) does not contain solutions similar to the 
US, where a failure to comply with a discovery order may have far-reaching 
consequences for the defendant including a default judgement against it or 
84 R. Molski [in:] T. Skoczny, A. Jurkowska, D. Miąsik (eds.), Ustawa..., p. 1694.
85 C. Banasiński, E. Piontek (eds.), Ustawa ..., p. 678.
86 For the sake of the effectiveness of the scheme, the UOKiK President should be able to 
protect gathered evidence against disclosure even when leniency applicants waive the protection 
– see ibid., p. 678. In this respect, compare the Commission’s proposal in the White Paper 
(point 2.9) concerning voluntary disclosure of leniency statements.
87 See point III. 1. above
88 See point II above.
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holding it in contempt89. Unlike third parties, litigants cannot be fined for an 
unjustified refusal to produce requested documents90 and so risk only that 
the court would interpret their disobedience unfavourably while assessing the 
evidence91.
IV.  Effect of the UOKiK President’s decisions 
on subsequent civil lawsuits
It would be inappropriate to limit this discussion only to the protection 
received by leniency applications directly, seeing as the substance of the 
submission gets published in the UOKiK President’s decision. Possible private 
plaintiffs could make good use of these administrative acts, considering 
that they clearly state the fact that the applicant participated in an antirust 
infringement. It is thus necessary to discuss the legal status of UOKiK 
President’s decisions in civil proceedings. If defendants were unable to question 
their findings in response to follow-on damages suits, the attractiveness of the 
leniency programme would decrease92. Still, when the defendant was found 
to have infringed competition law, a mechanism that would ease the burden 
placed on private plaintiffs could greatly incentivise the development of 
private enforcement. A good example of such solution exists in the US where 
a final judgment in civil or criminal proceeding brought by or on behalf of 
the US, declaring that the defendant has violated antitrust laws, is prima facie 
evidence in any proceedings brought by a third party against this defendant 
under antitrust laws93.
Polish jurisprudence contains varying answers to the question whether 
administrative decisions have a binding effect on civil courts – the issue 
must be treated as not unequivocally resolved yet94. As a rule, courts are not 
bound by administrative decisions as to the assessment of the facts. Judicial 
freedom in evaluating evidence95 can be limited on specific legal grounds 
only. In Poland, this is possible exclusively in relation to the binding effect 
89 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 37(b)(2)(A).
90 See Article 251 KPC.
91 Article 233 § 2 KPC.
92 See K. Nordlander, “Discovering Discovery …” , p. 655.
93 Clayton Act §5 (a), U.S.C. §16 (a).
94 The discussion of the Polish Supreme Court jurisprudence concerning a related problem 
– whether a decision by the UOKiK President is a necessary prerequisite for filing a civil action 
for damages for antitrust infringement – can be found in A. Jurkowska, “Antitrust Private 
Enforcement…”, p. 70-74.
95 See Article 233 of KPC.
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of a judgment of a criminal court finding that a crime was committed96. 
Therefore, civil courts are not bound by an administrative decision as to the 
evaluation of the facts of a case97. However, the Polish constitutional order is 
based on the separation of powers principle (Article 10 of the Constitution). 
Courts are therefore precluded from adjudicating upon a matter reserved by 
the law for administrative bodies. Hence, courts must respect legal situations 
created by final administrative decisions98. 
Nevertheless, a decision of the UOKiK President classifying an agreement as 
restrictive of competition is declaratory in nature99. Anti-competitive practices 
contrary to the prohibitions contained in Article 6 of the Competition Act (and 
possibly Article 81 of EC Treaty) are void ex lege100. It would seem therefore, 
that courts should be able to decide if an agreement is anti-competitive 
independently of the UOKiK President. A similar position was taken by the 
Supreme Court in its resolution of 23 July 2008101. The resolution states that 
if a final administrative act declares the assessed conduct as anti-competitive, 
the court is bound by this conclusion but, in the absence of a UOKiK 
President’s decision, civil courts can decide the matter independently. Current 
jurisprudence seems to point in the direction of civil courts being bound by 
final decisions of the UOKiK President, even though, there is no specific 
legal basis for such a restriction of judicial discretion. There is no stare decisis 
doctrine in Poland and the Supreme Court does not create law. In practice 
however, its resolutions and judgments are followed by lower courts. It is 
therefore likely that courts will accept the fact of a defendant’s participation 
in an unlawful agreement on the basis of an administrative decision to that 
effect102. 
 96 Article 11 of KPC.
 97 See W. Siedlecki, Z. Świeboda, Postępowanie cywilne. Zarys wykładu, Warszawa 2004, 
p. 45–46.
 98 See the resolution of the seven judges of the Supreme Court of 9 September 2007, III 
CZP 46/07, (2008) 3 Orzecznictwo Sądu Najwyższego – Izba Cywilna, item 30.
 99 K. Kohutek [in:] K. Kohutek, M. Sieradzka, Ustawa o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów. 
Komentarz, Wolters Kluwer, Warszawa 2008, p. 421-425. It should be noted that the part of 
a decision where the President orders the adresee to do or refrain from doing something has 
a constitutive character.
100 See Article 6(2) of Competition Act.
101 The resolution of the Supreme Court of 23 July 2008, III CZP 52/08, (2009) 7–8 
Orzecznictwo Sądów Polskich, item 86.
102 See A. Jurkowska, “Antitrust Private Enforcement…”, p. 74. The plaintiff would still 
have to prove the damage sustained, fault on part of defendant and the normal causal link 
between the unlawful act and the damage, see Article 415 of Civil Code.
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This conclusion, even though reasonable in terms of uniform application 
of antitrust law103, is still controversial seeing as it lacks direct legal basis. The 
Supreme Court has relied on Article 16 of Regulation 1/2003 to justify the 
binding effect of UOKiK President’s decisions on civil courts, even though 
this provision applies to decisions issued by the Commission only104. This 
conclusion is also called into doubt by an analysis of relevant literature from 
the period prior to the resolution. At that time, Polish doctrine predominantly 
believed that, even though a binding effect of administrative decisions finding 
an antitrust violation on civil courts adjudicating private claims seemed 
a rational and wanted solution, it was not yet introduced in any provision of 
Polish law105. 
Hence, a small possibility exists that a court might allow the defendant, 
who was an addressee of a final UOKiK President’s decision, to question 
its findings. The administrative act would then be treated like any other 
official document subject to free evaluation by the court106. Even so, it would 
be extremely unlikely for the defendant to be able to rebut such evidence 
considering that the decision was based on its own leniency statement. To 
conclude, leniency applicants should be ready to concentrate their defence in 
possible follow-on damages suits on the question of the amount of damage 
sustained by the plaintiff and the causal link between the execution of the 
agreement and the damage. Whether or not the court finds itself bound by the 
UOKiK President’s decision, it would certainly treat it as the most important 
piece of evidence in the civil case. Considering, in particular, the confessionary 
nature of leniency statements, a UOKiK President’s decision is likely to be 
practically binding as to the fact that the defendant infringed antitrust rules107. 
So far, the negative impact of this state of affairs on the incentives to “blow the 
103 The binding effect of Commission’s decisions on Member State courts is stipulated by 
Article 16 of the Regulation 1/2003. Even before the enactment of his provision, such a rule 
existed by virtue of the case-law of the European Court of Justice – see C-344/98 Masterfoods 
Ltd v. HB Ice Cream Ltd [2000], ECR 2000 I-11369.
104 See commentary to Article 16 of Regulation 1/2003 in K. Kohutek, Komentarz do 
rozporządzenia Rady (WE) nr 1/2003 z dnia 16 grudnia 2002 r. w sprawie wprowadzenia w życie 
reguł konkurencji ustanowionych w art. 81 i 82 Traktatu (Dz.U.UE.L.03.1.1). Stan prawny: 
2005.12.01, LEX/el 2006 and R. Whish, Competition Law, London 2003, p. 285–286.
105 See M. K. Kolasiński, “Odpowiedzialność cywilna za szkody powstałe w wyniku naruszenia 
wspólnotowych zakazów stosowania praktyk ograniczających konkurencję i nadużywania pozycji 
dominującej” (2007) 11 Przegląd Prawa Handlowego 20–21; A. Jurkowska „Perspektywy…”, 
p. 28; Biuletyn prawo konkurencji na co dzień 6/2007, UOKiK, Warszawa 2007, p. 16.
106 M. K. Kolasiński, “Odpowiedzialność…”, p. 21.
107 See B. Nowak-Chrząszczyk, „Roszczenie odszkodowawcze w postępowaniu w sprawie 
o naruszenie wspólnotowego prawa konkurencji” [in:] E. Piontek (ed.) Nowe tendencje w prawie 
konkurencji UE, Warszawa 2008, p. 447.
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whistle” has been limited seeing as it is fair to describe private enforcement 
of competition law in Poland as underdeveloped108.
V. The scope of leniency recipients’ civil liability
The US is a good example of how the participation in a leniency scheme may 
affect the scope of the infringer’s civil liability and thus impact private antitrust 
enforcement. A statute enacted in 2004109 (with a five-year sunset clause, 
recently extended by one year110) introduced major changes to the federal 
enforcement scheme, strengthening both types of incentives for applying 
for leniency – the “carrot” as well as the “stick”111. As far as the former is 
concerned, successful applicants are now offered a rebate on damages and 
removal of joint and several liability, if they provide “satisfactory cooperation” 
with claimants in follow-on civil lawsuits112. If the court determines that this 
condition was met, immunity recipients are held liable only for actual (rather 
than treble) damages attributable to their own share in the commerce affected 
by the violation. A similar limitation of the liability of a successful leniency 
applicant to its direct and indirect contractual partners, was suggested, 
although extremely cautiously, by the Commission in its White Paper on 
Damages Actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules (point 2.9).
Under Polish law, cooperating with the UOKiK President does not result 
in any change in the scope of the infringers’ liability towards private parties. 
Undertakings which obtain immunity or reduction of fines can receive no rebates 
on civil damages in subsequent lawsuits. They remain jointly and severally liable 
for the whole damage caused by their anti-competitive behaviour though with 
a right to contribution113. At the same time, none of the rules governing the 
Polish leniency scheme mentions redress, or any kind of assistance to antitrust 
victims as an additional requirement for whistleblowers. It is fair to say that in 
the US, interdependence between corporate amnesty and private enforcement 
is much closer – apart from the obligation to cooperate with the plaintiff 
108 See A. Jurkowska, “Antitrust Private Enforcement…”, p. 75.
109 Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act (hereinafter: Antitrust Reform 
Act), Public Law No. 108-237, 118 Stat. 665 (2004).
110 See Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004 Extension Act, 
Public Law No. 111-30, signed by the US President on 19 June 2009.
111 Pursuant to sec. 215 of the Antitrust Reform Act, sections 1, 2 and 3 of the Sherman 
Act were amended to  substantially increase the penalties for antitrust violations.
112 See sec. 213 of the Antitrust Reform Act.
113 Article 441 of the Polish Civil Code (the Act of 23rd April 1964 – Civil Code, Journal of 
Laws 1964 No. 16, item 93 with amendments).
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(a condition of obtaining a rebate), corporations applying for immunity are 
expected to make restitution to injured parties “where possible”114. Despite 
the lack of a comparable solution in the Polish scheme, the question of redress 
might nevertheless be taken into account as a factor for determining the 
amount of the fine. According to the Fining Guidelines, voluntarily removing 
the effects of the infringement shall be treated as a mitigating circumstance. 
When it exists, the amount of the fine, set at earlier stages, can be decreased 
by up to 50%115. It seems fairly clear that restitution to injured parties can be 
considered a “removal of the effects” of antitrust infringements.
In terms of de lege ferenda considerations, the chances of introducing 
a limitation on the recovery from successful leniency applicants are scarce 
in the Polish legal system. The prevailing opinion in the doctrine is that civil 
liability’s primary function has always been compensatory116 – any departure 
from the principle of full compensation will cause a dispute. Still, in the 
opinion of the Constitutional Tribunal the said principle cannot be derived 
directly from the Polish Constitution. Instead, it was said to derive from a 
“regular” statute – the Civil Code. Consequently, it could be at least somewhat 
limited by another “regular” statutory provision117. 
Such a provision applying to damages for antitrust infringements, if ever 
drafted, would certainly have many opponents. One author points out that 
a legislative act depriving antitrust victims of their right to seek redress from 
a leniency recipient would be similar to expropriation and thus require some 
form of state compensation118. However, the same author accepts the idea of 
limiting the scope of damages recoverable from a successful leniency applicant 
to damnum emergens only. Nevertheless, some commentators disagree because 
compensation for lucrum cessans often constitutes a substantial part of damages 
awarded in commercial cases119. Moreover, when the application of EC 
antitrust rules comes into play, limiting recovery to damnum emergens would 
be incompatible with the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice120. 
114 See point A. 5. of the US Corporate Leniency Policy, available on Department of Justice 
Antitrust Division website: http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0091.htm. 
115 See point 4. 1 c) of the Fining Guidelines.
116 See J. Kuźmicka-Sulikowska, “Funkcje cywilnej odpowiedzialności odszkodowawczej” 
(2008) 9 Przegląd Sądowy 13.
117 Judgement of the Constitutional Tribunal of 2 June 2003, SK 34/01, (2003) 6A 
Orzecznictwo Trybunału Konstytucyjnego Zbiór Urzędowy, item 49.
118 S. Sołtysiński, “Z doświadczeń...”, p. 47.
119 M. K. Kolasiński, “Wspólnotowa polityka zwalniania z grzywien i zmniejszania ich wysokości 
w sprawach kartelowych po reformie z 2006 r.” (2008) 6 Europejski Przegląd Sądowy 29.
120 See para. 100 of the ECJ judgement of 13 July 2006 in joined cases C-295/04 to C-298/04 Vin-
cenzo Manfredi and Others v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA and Others [2006] ECR I-06619.
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In an official comment to the Commission’s White Paper, the Polish 
Government expressly opted against using limits on damage liability as 
an incentive for the participation in a leniency scheme121. It stressed that 
public antitrust enforcement and private lawsuits should remain independent 
considering that they serve very different aims. The official statement concludes 
that providing the UOKiK with information revealing an infringement of 
antitrust law can be taken into account by civil courts as a fact justifying 
a moderation of the damages awarded against the whistleblower potentially 
because the defendant has contributed to minimizing the harm caused by the 
anti-competitive conduct. In the authors’ view however, such a suggestion 
de lege lata, finds no support in general rules of civil liability. In particular, 
informing the UOKiK of an antitrust violation contributes to the prevention 
of future damage, rather than to harm already done for which the plaintiff 
may seek redress. The whistleblower remains jointly and severally liable for 
damages caused by an anti-competitive agreement from the moment it entered 
into it, to the moment it ceased participation.
Having considered the above, one might wonder whether the “full 
compensation versus an attractive leniency policy” problem could be solved by 
the introduction of multiple damages for, at least some, antitrust infringements. 
Although ultimately abandoned, such a proposition was put forward by the 
Commission in its 2004 Green Paper with respect to horizontal cartels122. 
Its clear advantage would be the possibility to grant a conditional rebate on 
damages to a successful leniency applicant without leaving any part of the 
plaintiff’s harm uncompensated. In the authors’ view, there are no serious 
obstacles against introducing double, or even treble, damages for antitrust 
violations in Poland especially, because such legal institution already exists in 
the Polish legal system123. Nevertheless, to the author’s best knowledge, no 
such reform is to be expected, at least not in the nearest future.
121 Uwagi Rządu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej dotyczące Białej Księgi Komisji Europejskiej 
z dnia 2 kwietnia 2008 r. w sprawie roszczeń odszkodowawczych wynikających z naruszenia 
wspólnotowych reguł konkurencji [COM(2008) 165 wersja ostateczna], available on the 
Comission’s website: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ antitrust/actionsdamages/white_paper_
comments/rzad_pl.pdf 
122 See Option 16
123 On the basis of Article 105 of the Polish Copyright Act (the Act of 4 February 1994 
on copyright and related rights, consolidated text: Journal of Laws 2006 No. 5, item 31), an 
author whose economic rights have been infringed may, instead of seeking recovery under 
general rules, sue for “double or, where the infringement is culpable, triple the amount of the 
appropriate remuneration in the moment of its claiming” (emphasis added).
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VI. Concluding remarks
It is still difficult to draw definite conclusions about the intersection 
between the leniency scheme and private antitrust enforcement in Poland. 
Both of those instruments of deterring anti-competitive conduct are relatively 
new to the domestic legal system and civil actions, in particular, have so far 
been barely used in the area of competition law. In its current state, private 
enforcement is not a serious threat to the attractiveness of the leniency 
programme. Applications for immunity or a reduction of fines submitted to 
the UOKiK President are well protected against disclosure and, basically, 
cannot be used by private claimants without the applicant’s consent. The only 
possibility of gaining access to them against the applicant’s will is via a court 
order124 and, in the authors’ view, the chances of obtaining such an order 
seem weak. While it is true that this solution does not facilitate redress for 
antitrust victims, special protection of leniency statements seems fully justified 
considering that its lack could undermine the effectiveness of the whole 
scheme. That, in turn, would be disadvantageous to the injured parties as 
well since the existence of a final decision declaring an antitrust infringement 
makes civil litigation a lot less burdensome. Irrespective of whether or not 
UOKiK President’s decisions formally bind civil courts – and in the authors’ 
opinion this question still needs clarification – the perspective of follow-on 
actions may prevent some undertakings from applying for lenient treatment. 
That will be true however only if private enforcement actually gains popularity. 
Still, it might be necessary to consider introducing additional incentives for 
possible leniency applicants in the future, including the removal of joint and 
several liability or even a rebate on damages (the latter, however, would be 
highly controversial) but as for the present, any radical reforms of that kind 
do not seem necessary.
Literature
Banasiński C. (ed.), Prawo konkurencji – stan obecny oraz przewidywane kierunki zmian 
[Competition Law – Present State and Envisaged Directions of Changes], Warszawa 
2006.
Banasiński C., Piontek E. (eds.), Ustawa o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów. Komentarz 
[Act on Competition and Consumer Protection. Commentary], Warszawa 2009.
124  See point III.3 above.
YEARBOOK of ANTITRUST and REGULATORY STUDIES
122  EWELINA RUMAK and PIOTR SITAREK
Bazylińska J., “Współpraca w ramach Europejskiej Sieci Konkurencji” [“Cooperation 
within the European Competition Network”] (2007) 11 Przegląd Ustawodawstwa 
Gospodarczego 2.
Biernat S., Dudzik S., Niedźwiedź M. (eds.), Przystąpienie Polski do Unii Europejskiej. 
Traktat akcesyjny i jego skutki [Poland’s Accession to the European Union. Accession 
Treaty and its Consequences], Kraków 2003.
Cahill D. (ed.), The Modernisation of EU Competition Law Enforcement in the EU. FIDE 
2004 National Reports, Cambridge 2004.
Ereciński T. (ed.), Kodeks postępowania cywilnego. Komentarz, vol. 1 [Civil Procedure Code. 
Commentary, vol. 1], Warszawa 2006.
Jurkowska A., “Antitrust Private Enforcement – Case of Poland” (2008) 1(1) YARS. 
Jurkowska A., “Perspektywy prywatnego wdrażania prawa ochrony konkurencji w Polsce na 
tle doświadczeń Wspólnoty Europejskiej” [“Perspectives of Private Antitrust Enforcement 
in Poland in the context of the European Community’s experience”] (2008) 1 Przegląd 
Ustawodawstwa Gospodarczego.
Jurkowska A., Miąsik D., Skoczny T., Szydło M., “Nowa uokik z 2007 r. – kolejny krok 
w kierunku doskonalenia podstaw publicznoprawnej ochrony konkurencji w Polsce” 
[“New Act on Competition and Consumer Protection – Next Step in the Direction of 
Improving the Basis of Public Protection of Competition in Poland”] (2007) 4 Przegląd 
Ustawodawstwa Gospodarczego.
Kohutek K., Komentarz do rozporządzenia Rady (WE) nr 1/2003 z dnia 16 grudnia 2002 r. 
w sprawie wprowadzenia w życie reguł konkurencji ustanowionych w art. 81 i 82 Traktatu 
(Dz.U.UE.L.03.1.1). Stan prawny: 2005.12.01, [Commentary to the Council Regulation 
(EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the Implementation of the Rules on Competition 
Laid Down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty], LEX/el 2006.
Kohutek K., Sieradzka M., Ustawa o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów. Komentarz [Act 
on Competition and Consumer Protection. Commentary], Warszawa 2008.
Kolasiński M. K., „Odpowiedzialność cywilna za szkody powstałe w wyniku naruszenia 
wspólnotowych zakazów stosowania praktyk ograniczających konkurencję i nadużywania 
pozycji dominującej” [“Civil Liability for Damages Incurred as a Result of an 
Infringement of Community Bans on Competition Restricting Practices and Abusing 
of Dominant Position] (2007) 11 Przegląd Prawa Handlowego.
Kolasiński M. K., “Wspólnotowa polityka zwalniania z grzywien i zmniejszania ich 
wysokości w sprawach kartelowych po reformie z 2006 r.” [“Community Policy of 
Granting Amnesty from Fines and Reducing them in Cartel Cases after the Reform 
of 2006”] (2008) 6 Europejski Przegląd Sądowy.
Kuźmicka-Sulikowska J., “Funkcje cywilnej odpowiedzialności odszkodowawczej” 
[“Functions of Civil Liability to Pay Damages”] (2008) 9 Przegląd Sądowy.
Leslie Ch. R., “Antitrust Amnesty, Game Theory and Cartel Stability” (2006) 31 Journal 
of Corporation Law.
Molski R., „Programy łagodnego traktowania – panaceum na praktyki kartelowe?” 
[“Leniency Programmes – Panacea for cartels?”] (2004) 1 Kwartalnik Prawa 
Publicznego.
Nordlander K., “Discovering Discovery – US Discovery of EC Leniency Statements” 
(2004) 25(10) European Competition Law Review.
Vol. 2009, 2(2)
POLISH LENIENCY PROGRAMME AND ITS INTERSECTION WITH… 123
Piontek E. (ed.), Nowe tendencje w prawie konkurencji UE [New Tendencies in EU 
Competition Law], Warszawa 2008.
Reynolds M. J., “Immunity and Leniency in EU Cartel Cases: Current Issues” (2006) 27(2) 
European Competition Law Review.
Sánchez Graells A., “Discovery, Confidentiality and Disclosure of Evidence Under the 
Private Enforcement of EU Antitrust Laws” (September 8, 2006) Instituto de Empresa 
Business School Working Paper No. WPED06-05.
Sandhu J. S., “The European Commission’s Leniency Policy: a Success” (2007) 28(3) 
European Competition Law Review.
Schwab A., Steinle Ch., “Pitfalls of the European Competition Network – Why Better 
Protection of Leniency Applicants and Legal Regulation of Case Allocation is Needed” 
(2008) 29(9) European Competition Law Review.
Siedlecki W., Świeboda Z., Postępowanie cywilne. Zarys wykładu [Civil Procedure. An 
Outline], Warszawa 2004.
Skoczny T., Jurkowska A., Miąsik D. (eds.), Ustawa o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów. 
Komentarz [Act on Competition and Consumer Protection. Commentary], Warszawa 
2009.
Szanciło T., “Prekluzja w postępowaniu gospodarczym” [Preclusion in Proceedings in 
Commercial Matters] (2007) 6 Przegląd Prawa Handlowego.
Amerykański i europejski system ochrony konkurencji [American and European System of 
Competition Protection], UOKiK, Warszawa 2007.
Biuletyn prawo konkurencji na co dzień [Competition Law For Every Day - Bulletin] 6/2007, 
UOKiK, Warszawa 2007. 
Whish R., Competition Law, London 2003.
Wils W., Efficiency and Justice in European Antitrust Enforcement, Hart Publishing, Oxford 
and Portland, Oregon 2008.
Wiśniewski T. (ed.), Postępowanie sądowe w sprawach gospodarczych [Judicial Procedure in 
Commercial Matters], Warszawa 2007.
